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Introduction
World War I brought many new advances in technology to

the world. These new technologies brought

new methods

warfare and changed the way wars were fought forever.

to
They

introduced many new aspects to the battl-es fought during

the war, and most of t.hese technologies added to the
effici-ency of Lhe killing
One

of the

most.

of the troops fighting the war.

feared technol-ogies that were

developed during World War I was chemical weaponry. This
new technology proved t.o be

and continually instilled

very effici-ent during the war,

fear in the troops fighting the

war. The physical effect.s caused by the weapons were
devastating to the troops. Many considered exposure to the
weapons

a fate worse then death because of the

immense pain

caused. The physical pain caused by the weapons during

battles was only a part of the anguish caused by the
chemical weapons. The ignorance among the troops about the
weapons

also added to the overall effect.s of the

during the war.

weapons
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The development of these weapons constj-tuted much of

the technologlcal advances during the war by both sides.
Thousands

of different chemicals were being tested during

the pre and early war years for their effectiveness against
opposing armies. Many of these ehemicals were already being
produced in massive quantities for civilian

use and were

transformed into weapons during this time.

fn this paper I will show t.wo of the major changes due
to the use of chemical weapons during World War I.

The

first being the tactical change brought because of the
weapons. I will show this aspect through looking at the

first battle where chemical
illustrate

weapons were

used. I will also

the advancement in the methods of deployment and

the importance they had on the effectiveness of the
weapons. I will show the different approaches, both

offensive and defensive, to

chemj-ca1 warfare

by the

opposing sides of the war.
The second aspect I will- explore is the ethical

decisions made about. usi-ng the weapons during the war.

of the ehemical companies

made huge

Many

profits duri-ng the war

years because of the production of the weapons and they
gained from the deaths of thousands of troops. The armies

deploying the weapons also saw the horrifying physical and
devastating menLal conditions caused by the weapons,

4

however the use of the weapons was continual throughout the

war. fn response to the

weapons being used

the development

of the gas mask was the most evident defensive

measure

taken during the war, and the gas mask represented an

ethical choice of protection for the troops. The gas mask
also introduced a tactical change to the war because of the
ineffecti-veness of many of the gases used.
By using a topical approach I will show these

different elements to illust.rate the impact of chemical
weapons

during the war.

5

The Tactical Change Through the Battle at Ypres
The war brought many of the new technologies from the

laboratory and test,ing process Lo the battlefield.
weapons were among these new weapons. The

in 1915 was the first

Chemical

battle at Ypres

time these weapons were unleashed

on

the soldiers during the war. Up until- this time the
milit.ary leaders on bot.h sj-des of t.he war were skeptical
about using chemical weapons. According to Marshall, the
Germans had prepared

for the use of the

weapons

by

a

constant carronade for the two previous days.1
The devastation caused by the gas at the battle at

Ypres, both physical and tactical, was important to the

further use of the

weapons

during the war. Martin Gilbert

has noted that. the use of the chemical weapons

was

devastating.2 He states further that when the chemicals were
released it made many of Lhe men get into comatose and

dying positions.3 This changed tactics in battle for the

rest of the war.
The Battle at Ypres that took place on April 22, 19L5
was the first

instance in World War I where chemical

' S.L.A Marshall, The American Heritage History of World War I. Washington D.C.: (American Heritage
Publications, 1964), pp. 106.
2
Martin Gilbert, The First World War. (New York: Holt and Company, 1994),pp. 144.
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weapons played

From

a key rol-e in how the battl-e was fought.

there on the way the war was fought changed.

Love

states that, "Gas was often a double-edged sword capable of
blowing back to its point of origin..." Marshall and Hart

also suggested that the use of chemical weapons at Ypres
made an impact.

that

changed. the

rest of the war.

Marshall also maintains that the change was not

However

as

effective as the armies had hoped.t The development of the
gas mask helped the armies on both sides all-eviate the
problems with gas.

As the sun set over the battlefield

of Ypres in

northern France the A11ied troops began to sme1l a

"devilish j-ncense" and they had no idea what horror had
just been released on them.t The fog was a greenish-ye1low
haze that crept along the ground into the trenches. The gas

quickly covered two French divisions and the

men began

to

feel the immediate effects of Chlorine gas poisoning.

The

only lasted 15 minutes, but unleashed the

gas

bombardment

on the men.'The gas quickly made t.he men ineffective and

this opened a breach in the northern flank for the

Germans

to exploit. Gilbert maintains that this caused a four
pp.l44.
'Gilbert,
o

Dare Love, Trenches on the Web, "The Second Battle of Ypresd,"
http://www.worldwarl .com/sf2ypres.html, 199 6.
5
Marshall, pp. 107.
6
Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1930), pp.175
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hundred yard gap in the allied l-ines and t.his created

a

huge tactical advantage for the Germans.t t<eith Robbins

states that the

Germans were

not as hesitant to use the

9ds, however the A1lies were most apprehensive.e The other

divisions that

made

up the front and south flanks were

Canadian troops, and the Germans could easily begin pushing

back the remaining forces. Most of Lhe Canadian and British

troops escaped from t.he gas, but the French suffered major
losses.
The battle at Ypres raises many questions for

historians.
the

Why

did the gas

Germans? How did

come

as such a surprise from

the British troops make it out with

very few casualties when the French suffered massive
casualties?

Liddell Hart suggests one interpretation that

German

prisoners taken near the end of March of 1915 told the
commanders about.

the cylinders of gas and how they

were

going to be deployed. The British and the Canadian forces

took the information under advisement, but the French
commanders

notify

didn't pay much attention to it.10 The French did

some

of the field

commanders,

but

made no

official

warning available t.o Lhe troops.
7

Marshall, 107.

8

Gilbert, pp.l44.

n

Robbins, Keith, The First World War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 46.
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Gas weapons had been banned

The Hague Conference itself

the war was fought.

One

at the

Hague conference."

was set up to look at the way

of the main jobs of the conference

was to look at the effects of the weapons. The Hague

conference set many new laws for warfare, known as the
Hague

Laws." The Hague outlawed many of the

including chemical

weapons

weapons.

The New York Tribune ran a series of stories on the

battle at Ypres, and it. was very clear they
Germans

made the

look extremely barbaric. The paper explained

and

justified this attitude because of the banning at the
conference. The article also shows how many didn't

Hague

know

what to expect because gas was such a new weapon. One of

the article states,

rrThe gaseous

vapor which the

Germans

used against the French divisions near Ypres last Thursday,

contrary to the rules of the
new element

Hague Convention,

introduces

a

into warfare."13

The Germans had 57oo cyli.nders worth of chlorine gas.
These cylinders were the first

form of dispersion, and they

were very effective because of the way it released the gas.

to

Hart, pp. 177

ll Love, pp.4

Antoniou (editors), The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of
'2 Michaii E Reisman, and Chris T.
Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflict. (New York: Random House, 1994),

pg.xxi.

iiWltt Irwin,

"The Use of Poison Gas", The New York Tribune , 27 Apt',l
http://www.lib.byu.edr.r/-rdh/wwil1 9 I S/chlorsas.htrnl).

l9l

5, pg. 2 (online at website:

9

The dispersing of the gas was planned to be immediately

followed by a bombardment of artillery

she11s, and strong

infantry assaults. The Germans knew with the soldiers
stunned they could move forward quickly. The gas

was

dispersed from the large canisters only feet in front of

the

German

trenches. Along wiLh the devastating effects of

t.he gas, Love also points out that because the German gas
moved

closely to the ground

many

of the French, British,

and Canadian troops were forced out in the open where they

could be shot by the German infantry.la
This use of the gas shows how it changed the way the

battles were fought. The use of gas could not only
immobilize the soldiers, but also draw them out from behind

their cover. If the

men chose

to stay in the trenches they

would have to face the effects of the gas. Many of the
who chose Lo remain

men

in the trenches at Ypres died of

suffocat.ion. Even though most of the Canadian forces

were

able to escape from Ypres with their lives, nearly the
entire L't Canadian division lost their lives from the gas.
After the first night of the battle, the breach left
open by the French divisions that were devastated the day

before meant that the Canadian troops had to go in and hold

the
la

Germans

Love, pp.4

back. The Germans had advanced during the

10

night. This t.ime t.he troops would be f ighting in a forest
instead of an open fie1d. The hope by the Al1ied

commanders

was that the gas couldn't float freely through the trees,

like it had on the field. However, knowing t.he gas would
not be as effective in the forest the

Germans commanders

planned to force an assault using artillery

and infantry.

This shows a massive change in the tactj-cs used by the
German army d.uring

the battle. The canadians held the

ground, until the next day when a breeze was able to carry

the gas t.o Lhe alIied trenches.ls

Some

of t.he Canadian

troops tried to prepare for the gas using

dampened gauze,

however this only aLlowed the soldiers to function to a

short extent and eventually they had to pulI back.
t.hough

the gauze helped the

men

Even

they did not keep the

effects of the gas ouL, and many of the

men who

survived

had respiratory-related health problems for the rest of

their lives.
The 1"t Canadian division had 228 men that were injured

by the 9ds, however of the men that did not die, Love
illust.rates that gas diminished their ability to fight

and

was a considerable facLor to why they died aL Ypres.16 Many

of the
15
16

men

Love, pp. 6
Love, pp. 7

could not resist t.he urge to rip off the

sma1l

11

gauze they had covering their face to try and gasp for more

air, and it is believed the

German

troops advanced quickly

and fired from less then 100 yards. By the end of the

battle at Ypres the Canadians had lost 5,975

men

out of

18,000 in t.he division.

After Lhe battle the

Germans

did not t.ake fuII

advantage of the new weapons. Many hj-storians I have

discussed like Marshall and Gilbert see Ypres as the

testing ground for the

new weapons, because

they had never

been tried before in battIe.17 If the Germans had continued

to

move south

they could have cut off over 50,000 Canadian

and British troops. The Bat.tl-e at Ypres was the worst one

faced by the Canadian troops during the war. Much of the

information that. Love uses throughout. his appraisal of the

batLle is

f rom Canadian

histori-ans. Other historians like

Gilbert and Robbins also recount the other loses of troops
by the French and British, it is clear the use of gas at
Ypres was devastatJ-ng physically t,o the f orces there.
One

of the themes about the gas warfare thaE. most of

the historians like Gilbert, Robbins, Hart, and Marshall
agree on is that the wind on the battlefield
f

must be

avorable f or the gas to be ef f ective. "...The attack

was

postponed repeatedly for favorable wind, and t.he attack

t2

plan had to be adjusted

This meant the battle of ypres

also acted as a testing ground for the cyli-nders containing
the gas, ds r will discuss next in the deployment sectj-on.
It also was clear that to equalize the battlefield with
chemical weapons the allj-es would have to put more

concentration on developing a new gas mask.
The battle of Ypres was the first

of

many

battles in

the First world war that were impacted tremendously by the
use of chemical warfare. The battlefield

at ypres was the

site of three more battles itself before the end of

t.he

war. The tactj-cs of fighting the war were changing for both
sides and it was clear t.hat the new chemical weapons could
be advanced into somethj.ng much more devastating. A11 of

the sources that r have cited have
the

weapons

shown

that the use of

at Ypres began a change in tactics in the war.

Gilbert makes it clear, however, that whire the creation of
the gas
the

mask

put a stop to

symptoms were never

made

many

of the effects of the gas,

totally al1eviated.1e They sti11

an impact on the soldiers physically, and with the

advent of Mustard gas the tactics in battre were

17

Marshall,

pp.

It Hart, pp.
178

107.

t'Gilbert, pp.146.

changed..
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Deployment and Ear1y Development of Chemical
Weapons

The battle at Ypres saw the use of many new chemical
weapons
many

that were very new technologies. Before the

war

of the chemicals that would eventually see the

battlefieLd were being used in households around Lhe world.
The chemical industry was very new, and most of the
chemj-cals being designed were for household or industrial

use.'o For instance chlorine was used in different cleaning
chemicals. When the war came along many of the different
chemical companies saw their chance to capitalize on
chemical weapons, even though most were banned at the

Hague

convention, as I discussed in the previous section. fn

early days of World War I chemical weapons were still
the laboratory, and much of t.he military spending
coneentration went to the development of these

Lhe

in

and

weapons

Both sides of the war were developing their own

new

chemical weapons. Unlike the development that took place

for the gas mask, which was mainly defensj-ve, the
development of the different tlpes of deployment methods

was for offensive warfare. The first
20

army to actually take

L"o P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles, and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service:
From Laboratory to Field. (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 13.

t4

the weapons from the laboratory to the field was the
army. However, the Al-lies were developing their

German

own

weapons. These new toxic agents included Phosgene, Hydrogen

Cyanide, Cyanogen Chloride, Lewisite, Nitrogen Mustards,
and Must.ard Gas. A11 of these dif ferent tlpes of chemicals
had differenL effecLs on the human body, and I will go into
more detail about the effects in a later section. These

chemical weapons were effective in different ways, and all

of them became useful t.hroughout the war. There were over
3,000 different chemicals being researched by scientists

for their use in weapooty, however only thirty ever

saw

battle, and even fewer were desired by the military in
following wars.

Many

of the chemicals didn't have the

combat effectiveness desired by the different armies. The

effectiveness was judged on the speed by which it affected
the troops, and the physical effects it
Much

had.21

of the concentration of the development of the

weapons went

to the deployment of the weapons.

The

deployment was an important factor because it decided what

terrain the weapons could be used on, and how much of

a

factor the wind would be when they were deployed.

" A.M. Pappenheimer, "section II Clinical Features," The Medical Department Of the United States
Army in the World War, In main author (fust in the list) put his name and then et al. Medical Aspects
of Gas Warfare, vol. 14. The Medical Deparftnent of the Army in the World War. (Washington D.C.:
Govemment Printing Office, 1926), pp. 88.
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Throughout peacetime after the war and during the Seeond
World War the United States development of these weapons
was constant, however these programs started during the

World V{ar I. The production remained constant because after

the effectiveness seen in World War I the weapons could

be

used even more effect.ively in World War II.

In 1899,

many

of the dj.fferent countries around the

world met at the Hague Conference. One of the main concerns

during t.he conference was the use of asphyxiatlng gas in
sheIIs." The united States proved to be one of the
strongest objectors to the new chemical weapons. Historian
Charles Heller explains the strong objections to chemical
weapons by

the United States because of the effect.s of

Lhe

weapons. Most of the weapons of war used were brutal enough
t,he United States government felt the use of these weapons

would cause too much agony and horrible pain of the

soldiers fighting the war.23 Chemical

weapons were

also

an

extremely new technology, and the United Stat.es was very
apprehensive about using them. The main American groups

against the use of chemical weapons included policy

makers,

military leaders, and peace advocates. Each had their

own

reasons for their opposition, but all of them wanted the

t6

same

things dealing with chemical weapons, which was their

non-use during the war
Even though the United States was very much against

the use of the weapons, this did not stop

many

of the other

counties from talking about the development of their
weapons. Later I will

the

discuss t.he dif ferenL laws writ.ten at

Hague Conference, buL even

didn't stop

many

weapons.2a Many
weapons because

own

the laws written at

Hague

countries from their production of

t.he

of the countries began developing their
they knew

some

own

countries wouldn't fo11ow

the Hague 1aws. France for instance was a country that
publicly developed its own chemical weapons before World
War I. France was the first

country to openly develop the

first gas fi11ed grenade; t.he grenade itself was a

new

technology in 1913 and 1914, and adding this new twist to

it only

made

it that

much more

terrible.

The Germans were

also developing chemicals during t.his time, however this
research was a mainly done outside of the military,

for

industrial and household use. At. the beginning of the
however, the Germans saw the effectiveness of these
"

war

weapons

Mui.@) Charles E Heller, Leavenworth Paoers: Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American

Experience. 1917-1918. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), pp.3.

ffi
2a

Michael E Reisman, and Chris T. Antoniou (editors), The Laws of War: A Cornprehensive Collection of
Primar.v Documents on International Laws Governine Armed Conflict. (New York: Random House, 1994),

pp.83.
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in trench style warfare.

Many

of the army policy makers

on

both sides of the war saw the indecisiveness of trench

warfare, and a deadlock had been reached on the Western
Front by late Lgl-4." Other historians tike Martin Gj-lbert
and Donald Richt.er maintain that trench warfare was one of
t.he many reason for the first

the

Germans

during the

use of chemical weapons by

war.26

The different leaders of the warring nati-ons wanted to

get back to the mobilized style of warfare. The different
armies conceived many different t)pes of alternative

tactics and strategies. For instance the British looked at
new bombing methods

to overrun

German

positions to help

relieve the stalemate. The first battle of Ypres saw this
method work

for the Germans. The different

bombardment

methods included long range cannon shelling and massive

offensive runs by the different troops to overrun the
German

positions. Most of these strategies failed, and the

Germans were making

Keegan and

their

own

plans for an of fensive.

,fohn

S.L.A. Marshall- also say the stalemate caused by

the trench warfare was also the reason for the massive
development and advancement of the tank in World War

"25 Heller, pp. 83.

Richter, pp. 12
'u Heller, pp. 83.

T.27

l8

The German solution involved the use of chemi-caI

warfare. The Germans, seeing the shortcomings of the French
developed grenades, decided to take another approach using

artiLlery she1Is. The German High

Command

first

decided to

use "T-She11s" on the Eastern Front on ,January 31"t

"T-Shells" were a new type of artillery

1915.28

developed by the

British; their purpose was to act like clalrmores, showering
shrapnel all over the opposing army." The German officers
were surprised to find the weapons were not as effective

as

they had hoped. The cold weather had neutralized the
chemical agent used in the shells.
The Germans then wanted to find new and more effective
ways to deploy t.he gas. The German High Command then looked

t.o Professor Fritz Haber, to find a new way of dep1oyment.30
Haber, believed that the "T-She11s" did not. provide a high
enough concenLration of chemicals. He then suggested the

use of large commercial gas cylinders as a delivery system.
Haber sai-d these canisters had two big advantages over the

"T-Shef1s." The first was the amount of gas that could

be

deployed and the second was that the cylinders didn't break

the agreements reached. at the

Hague conference.3t The Hague

Conference put forth many bans on certain weapons to be
2E

"

Heuer, 7.
Keith Robbins, The First World War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984),

pp. 102.

t9

used during the war. These included chemical weapons.
However, the laws only outlawed liquid chemicals from hoses

and not the gas warfare used by the Germans. In the first
and Second Hague accords limited the use of the different

chemicals in the war, these included Chlorine and Phosgene.
They also outlawed the development of new chemicals

strictly

for warfare purposes." However, by the beglnning

of the war several
made

at

had been added to the laws

Hague.

The first

in

amendment.s

Germany

gas that was recommended by the industries

for the army to use in the war was chlorine. It

was already manufactured in large quantiti-es for commercial

use, and was very effective against the opposing armj-es.
Chlorine met all of the military requirements: it

was

l-ethal and affected the opposing army immediately."
The gas from these cylinders was very effective for
many

different reasons. World War I was the first war where

trench warfare was widely used. This Literally meant

Lhe

opposing arrnies were in dug out trenches noL far apart from
each ot.her. In many instances the trenches were only five

meters apart. The gas coming from these containers would
30

3l

Heller,

7.

Heller,7.

32

The Hague Peace Conftren
University in the year of 1908, (New York: Garland Publishers, 1972),pp.159.
33

Heller, 7.
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stay close to the ground and seep into the trenches almost
immediately. The gases were released from \rfox" holes and
brought to the surface by long lead pipes. These gases

could be used on almost any battlefield whether it

was

woods, underbrush, ravines-trenches, or dugouts.3a
These cylinders were extremely effective at deploying

the gas, however the first large canisters proved to
many problems. The most obvious problem

have

with the canisters

was the size and weight of them. The soldiers could not
move

the heawy canisters themselves because most of the

canisters weighed cl-ose to one hundred and fifty

pounds.

Another problem wit.h the canisters was if any tlpe of fire

hit them they could potentially explode and cause

mass

casualties for the troops deploying them.3s The canisters
were so immobile that new ways of deployment of the gas had

to found. Another big problem with the canisters was wind
speed and dlrection played a big role in how effective the
deployment was.
The armies on both sides including Germany and

Britain then looked back to artillery

as a tlpe of

deployment. Mortars, grenades, and land mines were all
developed as gas weapons. By 19L7 and 1918 t.he development
3a
35

Heller,

14.

Leo P Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles, and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: From
Laboratory to Field. (Washington D.C.: Departrnent of the Army, 1959,), pp. 165.

2t

of toxic gases had branched out into the development of
incendiary weapons." rncendiary weapons are those that
produce an extremely high-leve1 heat or fire as a weapon-

After World War I the development of the flame-thrower

came

from this early work on incendiary weapons. The British
were the first

to develop the gas mortars used during the

war. The British developed a new delivery system from the
mortars ca1led "shots." The mortars were soon adopted by

the United States and the 4.s-inch chemical mortar

was

developed by July 191-8.3' This is clearly the evolution of

the different deployment systems of the

chemj-ca1 weapons

during the war.
The first

the

regiment in the British army to use mortars

Gas Warfare

Service

(GWS), was

established in L9l-8 and

they also used a British-designed Stokes mortar.38 It
desi-gned

was

to shoot very high into the air at an extremely

high velocity, and then used momentum to bring itself back

to earth. These mortars took the problem of wind speed
direction out of the equation, and thls form of
became

deplo)rment

the one most used. However the accuracy of these

mortars was not very good, and this caused problems for

hitting different important Largets, and the different
l5 Brophy, 167
37
38

Heller, 14.
Brophy, 123.

and

22

st.rategies being developed for chemj-ca} weapons had to be
adj usted

.

Over half of the gas weapon attacks took place at

night.3e To help warn the soldiers about the gas attacks

during the night different warning systems were set up.

The

alarms themselves were special sirens that were thought to
be very effective. These alarms had the intention of

allowing the soldiers to get their safety gear on before
the gas mad.e it to them. Yet. of all t.he soldiers asked
about the alarms just over half of them said they heard the
alarms.no This system was mainly a defensive approach by the

AlIies.
of the thirty different chemicals used during Lhe war
only about a dozen were ever desired by the military. The
chemi-ca1s were many times grouped by the different effects
they had on the

human

body. These different chemicals

caused many different devastating effect.s to the human

body, which I will illustrate

in a later sectj-on. without

protection the gas affected virtually

every soldier,

depending of what type of gas was being used. However along

with the development of the weapons came the defensive
equipment with urays to protect the soldi-ers from the gas.
3eDonald

Richter, Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I, (London: Leo Cooper, 1994),

11.
ao

Richter, 13

23

fn l-918 between 20 and 30 percent of all American
casualties were from gas weapons. This number was cut

down

to 3 to 4 percent after the widespread use of gas masks.al
By the t,ime the gas mask had been advanced from it first
conception to a very effective defensive tool in l-ate L9l7

the war was almost over. However this laid the groundwork
for masks used in subsequent wars.

at

Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions 1917-1918. (Washington D.C.: Govemment Printing Office,

t9t9),496.
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Different Trrpes of Chemicals Weapons and Phrreical
Effects of Gas Weapons
As I have i-llustrated in the previous sections, the
chemical_

industry was a developing indust.ry during the

years leading to Worl-d War I. Many of the different
chemicals used in the gas weapons were developed only a few

years before the war. Many different chemical companies

saw

tremendous growth during the war years and many of the
companies such as Du Pont made a tremendous amount of money

from the production of chemical weapons- Many of the
chemical weapons used. are chemical-s commonly used today.

For instance the chlorine was one of the main chemicals
used during the war, and today it is used in many different

cleansers, and in pool care, even though it is now in

a

very different form.
The different chemi_cals being developed at this time

had many effects on the soldiers on which they were

deployed. Researchers on bot.h sides of the war were also
developing different chemical weapons, and each saw the

potential for devastation from chemical weapons.

These

weapons could be deployed against apposing armies, and

cause massive suffering and death. Their different effects
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on the human body categorized the weapons from both sides.

lung irritants,

These categories ineluded eye irritants,

nasal irritants,

and skin irrj-Lants.a2 Some of the gases fit

j-nto more then one of the categories, however this proved

to be the best way of categorization.
Eye iritants

were gases that. mainly affected the eyes

of the troops and caused many different
These eye irritants

symptoms.

included:

-Brombenzyl Cyanide
-Bomacetone

-Chloracetophene

-Chloropicrin

-Xy1y1 Bromide

-Dichloret hyl sulphide (Mustard
Some

Gas)

a3

of the effects of these gases would

be

instantaneous and others took hours or even days to

surface. The eye irritants
the eye.

Many

had several different effects on

of the weapons felt like a sharp blow to the

eyes, acting much like the mace or tear gas of today, even

if the exposure was very limited. Most soldiers found the
pain almost instantly unbearable.nt other effects that
irriLants could also cause severe
in
o'

many cases prolonged exposure

damage

eye

to the cornea,

and

could cause blindness.

L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986), pp. 52.
a3
Captain H.C. Bradley, "section II Clinical Features," The Medical Department Of the United States
Army in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14, The Medical Departrnent of the Army
in the World War (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1926), pp. 81.
e Bradley, pp. 82.
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Most of the chemicals stimulated the tear ducts, and
massive amounts of tears would be produced, making the

soldiers almost completely b1ind. Most of the eye irritants
also

damaged the

tissue around the eye. Most eye irritanL

gases were felt immediately by troops when they were
exposed to the gas.nt xy1yI Bromide was a very popular

tearing agent because it was easily

made

ln a

brewi-ng

process. Most of the chemicals were made through long
processes and requj-red special facilities,

however the

process to produce Xylyl Bromide was extremely simple
compared
used.

to the production of

many

of the other chemicals

a5

Even though eye irritants

caused massive damage to the

soldiers, they were not considered the most effective
chemical weapons available. Lung irritants

proved to be the

most effeetive way to neuLralize troops. Lung irritants
caused a large number of the deaths from chemical weapons.n'
The most well known gas of the lung irritant

gases in World

War I was ehlorine gas. However, there were several other

lung irritants
-Chlorine,

Bromide

-Phosgene
-

Tri

ch1

ormethyl sulphide

-Chloropicrin
a5

Bradley, pp.82
Bradley, pp.82
a7
Bradley, pp.83
a6

used in the war. These chemicals included:
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-Mustard Gasas
Chl-orine has been used throughout Lhe history of

warfare and was not new to World War I. However, World

f was the first time this

weapon was used on

War

a very large,

strat.egic military sca1e. Most of the previous instances of

chlorine use were isolated, however the information

on

Lhese instances is limited because most were not recorded.

Chlorine is a highly effective reactive agent. ft, like
most other chemical weapons causes irritation

and kills

tissue. Chlorine is very effective because it causes an
instantaneous reaction in the respiratory system. It
immediately attacks the system, causing massive coughing
spasms, and many times violent vomiting. It also destroys

all of the tissue inside the 1ung, mainly the lj-ning,
in most cases the

damage caused

by lung irritants

and

is

i-rreversible and sometimes fatal.n'The chemical reaction is
caused when the chemical is mixed with the moisture from

the respiratory system or the eyes and produces
hydrochtorj-c aeid in the lung.

so

Chloropi-crin has many of the same effects chlorine gas

does, such as severe coughing and violent retchinga8
ae

Bradley, pp. 83
Bradley, pp. 83

The
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main difference between the two is that instead of an

instantaneous reaction that is found in chlorine,

Chloropicrin has a delayed reaction. Chloropicrin also
causes massive liver damage.sl
Even though it is not the most. well known, phosgene is

considered to be the most effective lung irritant.

When the

exposed to phosgene gas it caused an

troops were first

immediate gripping feeling within the chest. This effect
passes rather quickly, but it is very effective in stunning

troops for a short time.

When

the chemicals stunned the

troops they could not fight against the opposing

army

because of the tremendous physical effects they caused.
Sometime after

the exposure it then causes massive damage

to the lungs and respiratory system. Many of the effects of
phosgene

are t.he same as chlorine, but on a

intensified Ievel.

Phosgene was one

much more

of the most widely

used

lung irrit.ants in World War I . s2
Another type of irrltant
was the nasal irritant
many

of the

many cases

Same

much

like the lung irritants

chemicals. These nasal irritants

effects as the lung irritants,

the chemicals were not in gas form.

to

had

however in
Many

of the

A.M. Pappenheimer, "section II Clinical Features," The Medical Department Of the United States Army
in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1926),pp.l2A.
5t
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Bradley, pp. 83.
Bradley, pp. 84.
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nasal- irritant.s came in the form of smoke instead of gases.
The most common effect of these different smokes was to
make

breathing much more difficult.

for those affected by

them. Instead. of mai-nly affecting the 1ungs, Lhe different
smokes

irritated

the mouth, nose and throat.

One

of the

most common of these smokes was phenychlorasin. ft caused

violent coughing and sneezing atLacks, sometimes for
hours.s3 The smokes were not very effective during battle,
and they were seldom used throughout the war. Gas masks

easily filtered these different

smokes.

sa

Skin irrj-tants cause the most evident physical

damage

all of the different chemical weapons. Wit'h the
exception of the lung irritant weapons, the skin irrltants
among

were t.he most effective chemical weapons used during the
war.ss The mosL Common and most devastating of these skin

irritant.

weapons was mustard

gas. Mustard gas was

considered by many to be the mosL effective of all chemj-cal
weapons used

during the war. Many called mustard gas the

..king', of all the chemieal weapons.tt It was consi-dered

Lo

be the king of the weapons because it affected almost every
53

Bradley, pp. 85.

t'H.L. Citcrest, "section I, Organization

and Administration of Gas Defense," The Medical Department
Of the United States Army in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14, (Washington
D. C. : Government Printing Offi ce, 1926), pp. 62.
s5
Bradley, pp. 85
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part of the body and caused disabling

damage

to the bodies

of the soldiers. The gas causes extensive blistering

and

burns on the surface of the skin and demands immediate
medical attentj-on. It also effectj-ve}y destroyed many of

the other parts of the body. These different parts included
the eyes, nose, and lungs. The effects of the mustard

gas

can also take up to Lwo or three days before affecting the

soldiers. It ls a very heavy gas and was very effective in
trench warfare. The reason for its

name

of mustard gas was

because of it sme11 and co1or.s7

Of al-I the different gases used in World War I,
mustard gas was continually the most feared among the

troops on bot.h sides of the war. Mustard gas, much like the
attacked the moist parts of the body.

other irritants,

However, it was much more devastating because it affected

aIl- of the soldiers skin. The main concentrati-ons of the
burns were found in the moistest parts of t.he body. In

many

cases it would cause massive damage to the underarms and

groin, along wit.h the eyes and lungs.

s8

Unlike the other irritanLs, the gas mask offered
litt1e or no protection from musLard gas. Mustard gas was
very heawy and in
s7

many cases was almost an

Mike Iavarone, Gas Warfare, "Trenches on the Web,"

(htto ://www.worldwar

1 .c

om.

arm006.html) ( I 997).

oily substance

3l

when

it

came

in contacL with t.he

oily substance

came

human

body. Wherever the

into contact with skin it would produce

massive burn-like blisters.

The gas could stay in a very

confined area hours and even days after it was dispersed.
Many

times during battle the gas would be fired and it

would not cause an immediate reaction. This meant the

soldiers might only have suspected they were being
bombarded

with normaf artillery,

and the gas would take

effect sometime later. when it finally t.ook effect the
troops could be overrun by the other army.
Bot.h sides had developed

different gases for chemical

warfare, however many of the gases on both sides were the
same. The Germans developed most of the weapons used in the
war; the Allies took more of a defensive positj-on of
chemical warfare. The Germans developed t.he following
weapons:

-Benzyl Bromide (tearing agent)
-Dichlormethylether (tearing agent)
agent)
-Diphenychloroarsine (asphyxiating
se
(tearing
agent)
Bromide
-xy1yI
The a11ies al-so developed
gases:
and
-Cyanogen (Cyanide)
-Ethy1 Iodoacetate (British
sslavarone, pp.
7.
5e
60

laverone, pp. 5
Iaverone, pp. 5

their own chemical

tearing agent)

60

weapons
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Both sides of the war also shared many of t.he

same

chemical weapons aIso. These gases included:
-Bromacetone (tearing agent)
-Carbonyl Chloride (Phosgene)
-Chlorine (asphyxiate agent)

-Chloropicrin (tearing, lung irritant)
(Mustard
-Dichloroethylethylsulphide
51

agent

Gas,

blistering

)

Atl of these weapons

were

clearly devastating

physically to those effected by them, theY also caused
massive fear in the troops because of the drawn out effects
of the gases. The troops were not the only ones
affected by the gas. Animals and plant life were also

of

many

affected. A New York Times article even depicts the dumping
of the gas ouL at sea.t'It was clear the different armies
using the weapons didn't understand the environmental
danger the weapons posed. Major (P) Charles E. He11er best
described the impact of the weapons during the war, "Of al-I
the weapons used during World War T, none stimulated public

revulsion more then poison

6l

Iaverone, pp. 5.

gas..."53

..war Gas Dumped Far out At Sea," New York Times, 9 March 1919, Sec. A, Pg. 18, Col. 4.
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The Chemical Companies durinq Wor1d War I and the

Question of Ethics
World War I was the dawn for many new different

technologies in warfare. These new technologies also
brought many different ethical questions about their use in

warfare. Along with the question of their use in battle the
implicaLions of war profiteering also contributed to the
growth of these new and more effective weapons. Unlike the

other new weapons of Lhe time, chemical weapons brought
new

terror that could not be touched or seen.

a

The

physiological effects that I have discussed in previous
sections were not the only reason for the feeling of terror
among

the troops. The threat of the efficiency of these

weapons was

also a very real terror, the use of these

chemicals also separated the troops even more and in

a

certain aspect dehumanized war even more then before. fn
the case of chemical

weapons many

a distinct sme11, and in

of the chemicals brought

many instances these weapons were

unstoppable. Even though the A11ies first

t.ook a defensive

stand on the production of chemical weapons it. was clear

after the battle at Ypres, offensive measures would have to
be taken.
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As f have il-lustrated, many of t.he chemicals used in

the war were new to the world, and most of them were
developed either for industrial or household purposes'
companies manufactured these chemicals, and when

Many

the war

began they began to manufacture t.he chemical weapons. up

until the United St,ates entered the war t,he armed forces
had no interest in manufacturing or using chemical
weapons.6n The news coming from

the battles prior to the

involvement of the United States soured the idea of use of
chemical weapons by the Allied forces. When the United

States did enter t.he war, ignorance of not knowing how to
manufacture the weapons was quickly stripped away. The use

of the chemj-ca] weapons, first by the Germans, decided the
use of the chemical weapons by the Unit.ed States.6s

The

early production of gas was publicized mainly as a
defensive measure, and the development of gas masks
coineided with t.he development of the weapons.
One

of the main companies contrlbut ing to

t,he

development of the new weapons was Dow chemical. Even

though this raised the profits and production for the
chemieal company the founder, Herbert Dow, stated, "IL

*

was

E.N. Brandt, Growth Company: Dow Chemicals First Centur.v. (East Lansing: Michigan University
Press, 1997), pp. 85.
65
Benedict Ciowell, The Armies of Industry. (New Haven: Yale University Press, l92l),pp. 152
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the worst thing I ever had to do."65 The ethical question
devastated Dow and t.he rest of his family. His chil-dren
remember

their father feeling like he had to do his duty,

but never being at rest with the production of the war
gases. However, this was only the public stands by Dow.
Along with doing his dut.y the profits for his

company

during the war were staggering, over 50 million do1Iars.
Even though this may have been a tough decision for Dow it
is clear he had the future of his

company always on

his

mind. After the war the company had grown over twice its

size from before the war, and expanded to a larger chemical
producer.

sT

Dow's lifelong friend A.W. Smith received word in

October 191,7, from the director of the United States Bureau

of mines, that because of the introduction of chemical
weapons by t.he Germans, it was of national urgency to
develop it own knowledge of gas warfare. smith soon put
more then two thirds of his time into researching gas-

relat.ed equipment. However, he focused most of his

attention on the production of a more effective gas mask.
Dow company historian E.N. BrandL maintains that smith
was extremely concerned about. the ethical question of the
6 Brandt, pp.

85.
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chemical weapons on the allied troops, even though he

was

making a 1ot of money. His own personal goal to develop the

most protective gas mask possible became one of his top

priorities.

The two initial

problems he faced were to

make

non-fogging eyepieces and to find the most absorbent

materials to be put int.o the masks.6t Both SmiLh and Dow
were thrust into the chemical warfare program. At this

point the production of weapons was not

made

public, and it

was hidden for the duration of the war. Civil-ian personnel

did the initial

research done for the chemical weapons

program, but they were quickly puL under military rules.6e

This civilj-an work force quickly grew and it was the
popular belief among them that their research would help

win the war.
Dow and Smith wenL

in separat.e directions by t.he end

of the war. Smith

moved on

technologies, and

Dow

to developing other new military

coneentrated on t.he production of

chemical weapons. The different Learing agents made at the
Dow

plant were sent to Lraining

camps

all over the United

States so the troops going over seas could be trained

67

on

"Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry (The Nye Report), Us
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using gas masks.70 After the introduction of mustard gas by

the

Germans

at Ypres in

l-91-5,

both Smith and Dow were

brought back together and met in Washington to work on the
problem of developlng the United Statesr own mustard gas in

late 19L5. Many of the French troops cal]ed mustard

gas

"Yeprite" because of the battle at Ypres.71 The Al1ies
agreed that the Germans could not be left with the monopoly
with the

of mustard gas.72 Most of the personnel affiliated

war considered mustard gas to be the "king" of the chemical
weapons." Soon after Lhe decislon was made Smith and Dow
went to work on a crash program of developing mustard gas.
The entire t.ime Dow was developing the different

chemical weapons, he afso Concentrated on the development

of

new medical

technologies. He then created the

Dow

medical department located on the same grounds as the
chemical factory. Things were going well for Dow until

acciden! at, the training facility

happened, killing

an

one

soldier because of exposure to gas from a faulty canister.Ta
One

of the top officj-aIs at

Dow was accused

of

i-ncompetence

because of the accident, and Dow himself went on an

70

"
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aggressive campaign to defend him. Even though his efforts
saved the official,

the production of Mustard gas was moved

from Dow chemical- to a new plant designed by Smith.Ts

At this time
weapons was

much

of the manufacturing of the chemical

also taking place at the

Maryland. Edgewood itself

Edgewood

Arsenal in

produced between 20 and

30

percent of all the United States chemical weapons in
and it was a government installation.

the plant finished in mid

summer

The construction of

of L9L7. Many of the

different gases used in the war were produced at
it was not until the spring of

L91B

191-8

Edgewood;

that the production of

mustard gas had started. At the peak of the production at
Edgewood

the chemical- weapons personnel numbered 7,400

people.76 The Edgewood installation

itself was enormous- It

consisted of 2l- miles of standard railroad track, and 15

miles of narrow gauge railroad track. The arsenal was also
near two waterways, because this was a crucial element in

the production of the chemicals, and there were 558
building on the grounds aL Edgewood. These buildings
incl-uded three field hospitals, one complete hospltal, and
a Y.W.C.A.77

75
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Soon

after the Allied victory

eompany. He was more then

that his

company made

Dow assessed

his

satisfied wlth the contribution

to the war effort, and he took

certain comfort from knowing he helped with the war.

Dow's

wartime products varied and contributed to many different
departments. These departments included the ordinance
department, aircraft department, and the Na-y, along with

the Chemical Warfare Division." He was completely
Compensated after the war. Dow took most of the money made
from the war and took care of his employees by building
them new homes and communities. Dow felt an obligation to

do something good with the money earned from the war, and

it was clear he always fe1t. good about doing his part,

buL

terrible about the part he had to play.
Even though Brandt does not include the financial

status of the

Dow Company,

that

a l-ot of

Dow made

during the war it should be said

money from t.he

production of the

chemical weapons and many profited from the death of the

soldiers at the hands of chemical weapons. However,

Dow was

not the only case of a chemical

profits

company making huge

from chemieal weapons. Another company that took part in

the prod.uction of the different. chemical weapons was the
Pont Chemical
78

Brandt, pp. 96.
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World War I was caIled the "chemi-sts' war" and World

If was calIed the "physicists' war. "7e For. example a New
york Times article eredited chemieal weapons with more

War

American deaths in France then grenades and missi1es.80 As a

result of the war many of Lhe chemical companies production
within America shot up. This was also going on in Britain'
From 1-913
4,oOO

to

Lg2O

the production of dyestuffs shot up from

tons in 1913 to 22,500 tons in

1920.81 This

constituted a large portion of the materials needed to
produce chemj-ca1 weapons. In America the change in
production was even larger. Seven different firms in

Lhe

united staLes went from producing 3,000 tons of dyes in
i.9t-3, to 29,OOO tons in L920.82 This production capit.alized
over 3 million do11ars, and many of the companies
strengthened tremendously during the time of World War I.
Du pont and A11ied chemlcal and Dye companies were the

two largest and produced the most for export. By 1920 the

production at the Du Pont chemical plant was almost four
times as large as j-t was before the war.83 Du PonL took a

different road then most of the other chemical producers
during the war. The other large producers were A11ied
7e
Graham D. Taylor, Du Pont and the International Chemical Industry, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984),
pp.43.
8d"A Ch"*itts War," New York Times, Sept. 20, 1920, Sec' A, pp. 14, Col' l.

Et

Taylor,

82

Taylor, pp.44.

w.44.
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Chemical and Dye in America, fmperial Chemical Industries

in Britain, and I.G. Farben in Germany. These went into the
further development of the existing chemicals of the time'
Du Pont's board of directors saw more profit
new chemicals

in developing

for the war.8n Du Pont earned huge war profits

and was the largest supplier of smokeless powder and high

explosives for Lhe AIIies during the war. It was cl-ear that
a 1ot of money was being made from t.he chemicals, a New
York Times storY boasted about how "Toxic War Gases" would

help the industry.ss
Du pont board of director, s took Lhe opporLunity of

the war to develop these new chemicals to ensure a
financial future for the

company.E5

Another Du Pont

historian David A. Hounshell staLes that Du Pont saw the
decades around the war as the experj-mental era.87 fn 1913,
Du Pont shipped. 20,OOO tons of chemicals to Britain, valued

at over 9 million dollars, and made up B0 percent of Du
Pont,s total market. Britain was not ready for the amount
of chemical production the war calIed for, so they looked
to many outside countries to supply them.88 In 1918 Du Pont
83
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went public that they were producing the chemical weapons.
The production of the different chemical weapons had to be
done very quickly, and new processes had to be developed to

produce the different weapons at a faster rate. This makes

it clear that Du Pont was very aware of the
made from

money being

the chemicals being sent over seas. Even Lhough

the chemicals were causingi massive suffering during the

war

the producLion by Du Pont never dropped. Du Pont and other
chemical companies believed the speed up production was one

of the crowning achievements during the war.8e The
production advancement done by the Du PonL Company duri-ng
World War I laid the groundwork for the production and
d.evelopment

of synLhetic rubber, synthetic fuels, and the

entire field of petrochemicals.

e0

Du Pont's work and advancements during the war were

clearly only for financial- gain. Taylor points out that the
decisions

made

by Du Pont's board were strictly

financial.

They never took Lhe effects of the weapons into account,

like the

Dow

profits from

chemical company did. Du Pont's reported gross
1-9L7-1918 equaled more

then 599 millions

do11ars." This huge gain in company profit allowed the

Du

Pont Company to look into new ventures, one of these being
8e
eo

el
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the General Motors Corporation.e2 Du Pont's chemical
production during World War f made them one of the
strongest chemical producers in the worId, and established
them as a strong company super power. Hounshell states
t.hroughout his analysis of Du Pont that the money made from

the production of the chemi-cals solidified Du Pont as a
power in the chemical industrY.e3
The production of the chemical and other weapons by

the large companies during the war brought
after the war was over. To answer

some

many questions

of these questions

a

special committee was formed in the United States Senate.
The Committee was cafled the Nye committee, named after a
senator from North Dakota

named

Gerald Nye. Nye was the

chair of the committee, and it.s primary goal was to look at
the munitions industry during the war.en The commj-ttee
looked at the preparedness and elite mobilization practices
of the war. The investigation of the munitions industry
incl-uded, but was not limited to, the Sales, manufacturing,

exports and imports, and relevant legislation

and

treaties.es The investigation took place during the spring
of Lg26. Koistenunen states that the Nye committee reports
e2

Taylor,Tl.

e3
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stand alone on the interwar studies of the economics of
modern

warfare. Since the Nye committees' analysig

many

scholars have questioned the results because of the
intemperance of Nye himself.e6
The Nye commi_ttee inquiries can be broken up into

three separate secLions. The first was the web of business,
governmental, and extra governmental ties at home and
abroad for the munitions industry. The second dealt with

the role of different American financial houses, including
J.p. Morgan & Company. The third was the secreLary of warrs
plans for mobil-ization and the actual mobilization.eT
The findings of the Nye committee were not good for
the munitions companies, including Du Pont.eB The findings
suggested the companies underminded peace by working
against. disarmament, arms control, and arms embargos." They

also found that Du Pont, with several other

companies,

conspired to share patents, divided markets and profit
poo1s, circumvent embargos, and oppose arms control
measures.lo0 They broke many
amounL

*
e7

different laws to

make

a

huge

of profits during the war. Other crimes commltted by

Koistinen, pp.254.
Koistinen, pp.256.

..Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry (The Nye Report), Us
Congrlss, Senate, 74* Corrgress, 2'd sess., February 1936,* htEr://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/inteVnye.html,

e8

1998.

e Koistinen, pp.257.
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the companies found by the Nye committee included,

9uD

running by selling i11ega11y through intermediaries, and

falsifying

documents

.

101

It was clear from the Nye committee findings that
munitions companies like Du Pont made a tremendous amount

the war, and ignored any moral or ethical
obligations that have to do with weapons production. fn the
month of October L9L7 over 24 t,housand Americans died due
of

money from

to exposure to chemical weapons.'o' Beyond the questions
associated with money it was clear the different chemical
producers were also not concerned with the suffering their

products caused in the war. Many of the board members at'

pont justified

the production of the

weapons

Du

by st.ating

they were helping the war effort.As stated earlier much of the public was kept in the

dark about the chemical product.ion, and there was not

more

American opposition to the weapons because the war was

being fought far from Amerlca. ff the war had been fought
closer to the United States there would have been protests
concerning the production of chemical because the public
would have been able to see the immediate effects of the
weapons. It also may have changed the ideals of the
ror

Koistinen, pp.257
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decision makers at the chemical companies because the

soldiers being effected by their

weapons would

not

have

been a half a world away. Throughout the course of the war

over 70 thousand Americans died because chemical weapons.to'
Unfortunately this ethical question of chemical warfare

was

not raised until after the war had ended.

'o'H.L. Gilcrest, "section I, Organization and Administration of Gas Defense," The Medical DeparEnent
Of the United States Army in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14. (Washington
D. C. : Government Printing Offi ce, 1926), pp. 27 3 .
lo3
Gilcrest, 273.
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Gas Maeks

and other Gas Defense Eqtripment,

when chemical- weapons were introduced

to the war

many

questions arose about the effects the weapons would have on
combatants. The gas mask was first

developed because of the

concern of the men working with the gas' Many of the

ethical questions were raised because of the chemical
weapons and as I have mentioned in earlj-er sections, there
was tremendous work on perfecting a gas mask for the A11ied

troops. The stand by the A11ies at t.he beginning of the war
was mainly defensive and the gas mask was a direct result
of the defensive measures taken. The gas mask also
constituted a change in Lhe tactics of chemical warfare'
skin agents, like mustard 9ds, were also used widely after
the development of the gas mask.'on The gas mask was the
most effect.j-ve way for the troops to prot.ect themselves
against the new chemical agents. The gas masks also allowed
the troops working around the weapons to work in a safer
environment.
The different tlpes of canisters used to hold the
weapons were not

safe and very dangerous. This

made many

of

the soldiers very reluctant to work around the chemicals'
Another reason for the development of the gas masks was to
take a defensive approach t.o the chemical warfare. Many of
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the different countries involved in the war had problems
fighting using the gas. The first ones to use the gas were
the

Germans

at the battle of Ypres. The UniLed States

and

the A11ies took more of a reserved approach, which included
more intensive development on the gas mask. It took until
al-most the end of the war before the first

effective

version of the gas mask was deve1oped.10s
During the summer of

L91-7

the news from the front

was one of wonder about. chemical weapons. The French and

British governments controlled what. news was printed in the
papers. However t.he UniLed St.ates newspapers were much more

liberal and sent back more uncensored news from the front.
Both the British and the French were worried and scared
about the picture being paint.ed about chemical warfare for

the public. The American troops on their way to war were
we1I aware of the reality of chemical warfare.'ot After

secret chemicals and experiments were made public in
technical journals the true news of chemical warfare was
more abundant.
The testing that was going on was also made public.
These tests included the effect.s of the war gases had on

animal-s, such as birds, dogs, caLs, and horses, and
rM

Martin Gilbert, The First World War. (New York: Holt and Company, 1994),p994.
'o'Gilbert, pp.95.

how

49

different masks coul-d help the animals survive or not be
affected. Horse gas masks were developed during the war to
protect the calvarY during gas attacks.to' For instance an
arLicle that was in the

New

York Times was titled

"Gas

Killed 756 Americans", and it was very open about the men
t.hat were being killed by the gas. Even though most of t.he
articles were on the back pages of the front section, it
stilI was not hidden from the American public. A sub
heading that says, *Average age of our soldiers who died in
France was 23 years oId" follows the top headittg.'ot

This news coming back from the front contributed to
the concentration on gas defense equipment development.
production of gas masks in America began in L9L7. The

The

United States turned out 5,250, OO0 gas masks considered to
be the besL in t.he world.to'ouL of all the gas

masks

produced before the armistice over 4 milIj-on of them went

overgeas. The gas masks t.hat. were sent were not only for

the American forces, buL all of the A]lies as weII. Al-most
every oLher count.ry within the A11led forces put a Iot of
effort in perfecting t.he gas mask.1'0 The gas mask was not
t6 Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions 1917-1918. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1919),410.
Ivarone, ,The Second Battle of Ypres, Apr-1915, "Trenches on the Web,"

lo' Mik.
HT
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"Gas Killed 756 Americans," NeJLygILIiIlqg!, August 6, 1919, sec. A, pp. 9
loe
Crowell, 410
llo Crowell, 4l I
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only to protect the Allied t.roops from gas attacks, but
also protect the troops from the gas when it was being
deployed. The different A11ied military powers felt it
would be more effective to have the troops protected from

the gas and it would give them an advantage over the

German

troops.111

The Germans put litt1e

concentration into the

protecLion devices and the American gas masks were
considered t.o be over 20 t.imes betLer then the

German

masks.tt' There was never a reported case of an American

soldier dying due to an American gas mask failing. The job
of developing Lhe masks for the American troops was given
to the Surgeon General of the United States' The
development of the gas mask came a long way from its
beginnings by the end of the war- The earliest forms of gas
masks were simply wet towels placed over

the heads of the

soldiers. Another early form was cotton and wool wrapped
around the soldiers' faces. This also brought on many other
types of screens used for protection against the gas
weapons.tt' In later development many different tlpes of
designs were test.ed to find out. which was the most

"'

L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1986), pp. 102.
l12
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effective to protect the soldiers. The designs had many
different aspects to them, some were like hoods, and other
only covered the mouths of the soldiers. Many of the first
gas masks had separate respirators, which hung around the
necks of the troops."n These masks had eleven mai-n parts

that consisted of knap sacks, rubber hoses, face and
mouthpieces, and an elastic strap to hold the sack tightly
around the soldiers' head. Different scientists working on

the development. decided that the separation of the mask and
the respirator box was not the most effective waY to
protect the soldiers.

The

box itself

was

clumsy and

many

felt it could not withstand the pounding of batt1e.11s
The development of the gas mask was done through

cooperatj-on between the American and British governmenLs.
The French, like the Germans, spent very litt1e

time

on

defensive equipmenL, concentrating more on offensive
aspects of chemical warfare. One of the biggest problems

with developing the masks was the quantity

needed.116 The

scientists developing Lhe masks also were laying the
foundation for later versions of the masks, however this
caused the problem of developing new teehnology and worki-ng
r13

Donald Richter, Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I. (London: Leo Cooper, 1994),
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through many mistakes. The gas masks were first

model-ed

after the British sma1l pox masks that were not, very
effective.'17 The sma11 pox masks were mainly designed to
protect the doctors and nurses from direct contact with the
airborne diseases, however they were not made to filter

toxic chemicals in the air.

Many

of the chemicals t.hat

out
were

being produced for t.he chemical weapons were also very

acidic and the masks could not filter
their heawy moisture."t These first

them out because of
sma1l pox masks laid

the much-needed groundwork for the later

masks.

The perfect mask was considered the one that

completely eliminat.ed aI1 effects of the chemicals to the

soldier's eyes, nose, and face. Fitting the different.
components

in a manner that was truly effective also proved

to be a problem. The eyepieces offered one of these
problerns. Designers had to find a substance that

was

transparent, but extremely durable. A substance called
triplex glass was decided on to be used for the eyepieces
of the gas masks because it met the different requirements
that were necessary."' Sealing the different parts of the

"Trenches on the Web", Chemical Warfare.
"'Ivarone,
ll8Capt'PaulJ.Hanzlik,..SectionIIIExperimentalResearch,',
States Armv in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14, (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1926\, pp. 663.

lle
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mask was

a problem because they had to fit together tightly

to prevent air from passing through
The most prominent scientists of the time were at work

on the masks and they began to develop new, more effective
substances to go into the masks. Several different American
companies patented many

of the new technologies. CrowelI

speculates that many new technologies came from t,his

productlon. As I stated in the previous sections,

A.W

Smith who worked for the Dow Chemical Company also devoted

a 1ot of his efforts on developing a more perfect

gas

mask."oFor instance the eyepieces may have started plast.ic
companies on their way to production. Many of the companies

were also making a lot of money from the production of the

chemicals, one of the largest being Du Pont. Many of the

different substances were those people wouldn't think would
go into gas masks. For instance charcoal was used in the

respirator boxes, because charcoal was very absorbent with
certain gases like chl-orine, and phosgene, however

because

of the different effects on the body from mustard gas
masks proved

t.he

to be useless.121 Perfecting the use of the

charcoal went through several different stages. Designers

l2o

l8

E.N. Brandt, pp. 87

Crowell,4l6
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found that the densest carbon would be the most effective

for the gas masks. Another strange substance used in the
respirator boxes was nutshe1ls."2 The demand for the
different nutshells was so large the

US government had

go to other tropical countries to supply their needs.

to

The

government also went to the public to help by savi-ng the

different shefl-s and pits for production.l23
Even though there was never a reported case of an

American death due to a faulty gas mask that does not

mean

t.here were no problems with the masks. There were times
when gas masks were senL

to the front. and they had to

be

sent back because there were defects in them. A New York
Times art j-cIe recounLed an instance of this during L9L8.L24
The article

illustrates how several thousand gas masks sent

abroad were defective and had to be sent back to the United

States to be tested and repaired. This article also

shows

that there was a Iot not known about the chemicals and many
were afraid the American troops had bad safety equipment.

Another insLance when masks had to be sent back was in late
1918 when several thousand masks had

to be sent back for

breathing mechanism defect. The soldiers were being
suffocated because the respirator was not allowing
122

r23
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air to pass through, and the soldiers had to remove the
mask

to breath.l2s
Another concern from gas warfare was for the animals

used during the war. For much of t.he war the use of horses
was

very important, and Lhe gas affected animals like

humans. Horses were

still

wideJ-y used because the

automobile was a new technology and the tank had nowhere

near the effectiveness of later designs. The end of the war
had changed the design of the early tank and it proved to
be more effecti-ve, however horses sti11 played an exLremely

important role in the war. Special gas masks were made for

the horses used in the war. Over three hundred thousand
horse gas masks were produced for the

war.126

There were also many different tlpes of defense
equipment developed during the war. Special blankets were
developed t.o keep the different gases out of the dugouts
and foxholes. The blankets were treated with different

chemicals to repel the gas. DifferenL types of creams and

ointments were also developed during the war to aid the

soldiers from the chemical weapons. The most frequently
used ointment calIed Sag Paste was used over the last part

"5 Ivarone, "Trenches on the Web," Chemical Warfare.
"6 It4uio4n; Charles E. Heller, Leavenworth Papers No.10; Chemical Warfare in World War I: The
American Experience, 1917-1918. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Combat Studies Institute, 1984),Pg'19
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of the war, and over Lwelve hundred Lons were shipped
overseas.

127

In the sources I have shown in this section, such

as

Ivarone and Crowe1l, it is clear the gas mask made an
impact on the war both tactically
mask made

it possibte for

many

and ethically.

The gas

l-ives to be saved from the

different war gases used. The defensive position taken by
the Allied forces was the main reason for the development
of the gas mask, and it is clear it was an ethical decision
to develop the gas mask. It is clear if t.he gas mask had not
been developed a much larger number of casualties would
have been due to chemical weapons.

r27

Crowell 430.
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have explored many of the different
aspects of chemical warfare during World War I through the

tactical changes and the ethical challenges of the war. In
researching for this project it, has become clear to me Lhat
chemicaL warfare had an impact on the war. Most of the

historians I have studied have agreed that chemical warfare
did not change the outcome of the war, but still

played

a

significant role in how the war was fought. Chemical
warfare had a profound impact on the troops fighting the

war. It is clear the
changed

men

fighting the war were forever

by their exposure to the horror of chemical

weapons, and many of t.he producers of the weapons gained

lot by its production and use. In all of the sources I

a

have

looked at. it is clear chemical weapons made an impact on

multiple 1eve1s. A11 of the different nations in the

war

took their own stance on chemical weapons some offensive
and some defensj-ve, but it was clear the positions changed

throughout the war. As I have illustrated

throughout. this

paper the introduction of Lhe chemical weapons during the

war impacted many of the tactical decj-sions made by the
opposing sides.
The ethical questions raised by t.he use of the

chemical weapons have continued until today and have been
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evident. in all the wars since. It could even be compared to

the most destructive force ever used in the Atomic

bomb

The development of newer chemical weapons such as Napalm,

and deforesting agents has made it clear World War f

chemical weapons laid the groundwork for several other
weapons used

in the wars since. Operation Ranch Hand in

Vietnam is a strong example of this. The issues about

chemical weapons sti11 seem to be as important today

they were during the years of World War I.

as

New medical

technologies have also displayed many of the after effects

of the weapons and it is clear

many more

ethical questions

have been raised in the decades since World War I

Both the tactical aspects and the ethical questions
were present at the time of the war and remained after t.he

war ended. There has never been a war fought like World
I

War

and I believe the chemical weapons developed during the

war are

a

large part of the reason why. The ethical

questions linked to them were asked by some, but not, by
many. As an evolving society one of the things that we have

to

make

decisions about is the limits of technology.

We

must also ask, "If we can, should we?" It boggles my mind

that the worl-d was a dark enough place for such a horror to
be unleashed. My only hope is that the people not only in

59

this country, but every country around the world can learn
from past mistakes.
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